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Abstract
This paper proposes a quantitative comparison of EMU's different fiscal rules, i.e., the
stability and growth Pact, the structural deficit rule and the golden rule. From comparing the
economic stabilizing effects of each rule, it concludes that the Pact is not the perfect solution.
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are mine.
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S i n c eE M Um e m b e r sh a v ef o r e g o n et h eu s eo fn a t i o n a lm o n e t a r ya n de x c h a n g e
rate policies as adjustment mechanisms, they are now searching for alternative ways
that can protect them from economic shocks. It is usually recognized that this role
should be assigned to ﬁscal policies. The framework for EU ﬁscal policy is deﬁned
by the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) which requires member States to maintain
a ﬁscal position of close to balance or surplus over the cycle, and never to exceed
the 3% of GDP ceiling.
The EU’s current long economic slowdown and the subsequent deterioration of
public ﬁnances well beyond the 3% limit have heightened the debate over whether
the SGP is an appropriate framework for EMU ﬁscal policy. The paper deliber-
ately avoids joining the debate but rather chooses to focus on the reform proposals
presently under discussion, i.e., the balanced structural budget and the golden rule.
The main advantage of the structural deﬁc i tr u l ei st h a ti tp r o v i d e st h ei n c r e a s e d
ﬂexibility that allows room for the automatic stabilizers to operate fully. In the
golden rule, government budgets are to be split into a current budget which must
be in balance, and an investment budget which has to be ﬁnanced through borrow-
ing. The rule is meant to boost the economy’s potential growth rate by encouraging
higher public investment.
This paper aims to rank the reform proposals and the SGP in terms of their
relative performance in economic stabilization. Various studies have compare these
rules (Buti and al. 2003, Creel 2003). However these studies have used the Kopitz
and Symansky model (2001) which implies subjective judgments. We therefore
propose to carry out a comparative study based on macroeconomic modeling. The
main results show that alternative rules have the same economic stabilization impact
and are more eﬃcient than the Pact.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 develops the analytical framework,
Section 3 presents the solution method, Section 4 presents a numerical simulation
of the model, and the ﬁnal section concludes.
2T h e M o d e l
We use a static model of closed monetary union with two countries i and j in
which we introduce an asymmetric demand shock1. Demand is given by classical
terms of literature (Buti and al., 2002): public deﬁcit (d), common interest rate (r),
and trade balance include intra-EU competitiveness (deﬁned of inﬂation diﬀerential)
1We consider only demand shocks because eﬃciency of ﬁscal policy to counter supply shocks is
widely argued (Brunila and al. , 2002).
1and diﬀerences in economic situations. Demand can be written as follows:
y
d
i = γdi − ρr + η(yj − yi)+ηε(πj − πi)+xi (1)
where y represents GDP, γ the sensibility of demand to public deﬁcit, ρ the
sensibility of demand to interest rate, η the measure of the countries’relative open-
ness, ε the elasticity of trade balance to the inﬂation diﬀerential, π the inﬂation rate
and x the asymmetric demand shock. Variables are in logarithms and expressed as
deviations from their long-run non-inﬂationary equilibrium. All the parameters are
positive.
Because of nominal rigidities, output and prices can diverge from their equilib-
rium values in the short run. This situation is rendered using a Phillips curve as
supply function (Leith and Wren-Lewis, 2002):
πi = θyi + η(πj − πi) θ ∈ [0;1] (2)
We assume that the European Central Bank (ECB), uses the interest rate as
a the tool for conducting its monetary policy. The aim of monetary policy is to
minimize a linear-quadratic loss function (LM) which depends on average values.
Price stability is the main objective of the single monetary policy. The implications
is that inﬂation is more heavily weighted in the loss function than others variables2.










where β1 and β2 respectively capture the relative preferences for output stabi-
lization and interest rate smoothing.
The behaviour of each government in the monetary union is described by a linear-
quadratic loss function (LG) which depends on its output deviation of the baseline,
its rate of inﬂation, and its public deﬁcit. Fiscal rules are modelized by a ﬁnancial
penalty f that increases the ﬁscal loss function. This ﬁnancial penalty depends on













+ f(di − e d)( 4 )
where φ1 and φ2 are the weights of the inﬂation rate and public deﬁcit in the
ﬁscal loss function, and e d is the deﬁcit target.
2It must be noted that an extra term has been added to the interest rate in the loss function
compare to traditional models. The simulations run on monetary policy rules indeed show that
optimal rules lead to an excessive volatility of interest rate, although this situation is not due to
the Central Bank’s behaviour. The solution then consists to include the interest rate in the loss
function (Rudebush and Svensson, 1998).
2Supply and demand functions allow to determine output and inﬂation:
yi = γdi − ρr + Ωγ(dj − di)+( 1− 2Ω)xi (5)









1+2η). Parameters Ω and µ can be interpreted
as the trade balance on output and prices. Both economies are connected by a
number of channels through which price and output ﬂuctuations spread across the
two EMU member countries.
3 Model Solving
3.1 Solution method
We consider that governments internalize the Central Bank behaviour when
making their own decisions. Indeed, if they take the single monetary policy’s cred-
ible commitment to maintain price stability for granted, the alignment of expecta-
tions will be enhanced and behaviour conditioned in a way which will lead to implicit
coordinated policy outcomes, while concurrently limiting policy conﬂicts and overall
economic uncertainty (Issing, 2002). In order to modelize this situation we use a
Stakelberg game in which governments are the leaders and the ECB the follower.
Firstly, each government makes its own decision, it also accepts the other govern-
ments’ behaviours as given and takes accounts ECB’s function reaction. Then the
ECB makes decision considering the governments’ decisions as given. The resolution
of such a game is made by backward induction.
3.2 Interest rate determination
The interest rate is determined by the ECB’s behaviour. We deﬁne the interest








. The interest rate rises with the average amount of pub-
lic deﬁcit. Consequently monetary policy depends on ﬁscal policy, which means
ﬁnancial eviction does occur.
33.3 Key variables
The expression of interest rate allows us to express output and inﬂation from
public deﬁcits and the shock:
yi = adi + bdj + cxi (8)
πi = θ(a − γµ)di + θ(b + γµ)dj + θ(c − 2µ)xi (9)
with a = γ− 1
2γρψ−γΩ,b= γΩ− 1
2γρψ, c =1−2Ω. Parameter a capture the net
impact of ﬁscal deﬁcit on output. This impact depends on the sensibility of demand
to public deﬁcit (γ), interest rate (1
2γρψ) and trade balance (Ω). Parameter b is the
ﬁscal externality depending on eﬀect on the interest rate and the trade balance.
3.4 Disaggregate public deﬁcit
The public deﬁcit can be broken down into three elements:
• the primary structural deﬁcit, noted ds, consists of the whole set of ﬁscal
discretionary measures which are not ap r i o r imotivated by macroeconomic
regulation. This primary structural deﬁcit is made up of the current deﬁcit
and public capital expenditures, in proportion h.
• the cyclical deﬁcit which depends of the economic situation according to sen-
sibility χ. It includes the automatic stabilizers and discretionary measures.
• interest payment of the public debt (B).
From the public deﬁcit breakdown it becomes possible to identify two diﬀerent
targets: the structural balance corresponds to the primary structural deﬁcit, the
golden rule is the current deﬁcit. The golden rule stipulates that capital expenditures
are ﬁnanced by loan, which consequently increases the interest burden. The public
deﬁcit is written as follows:
d =( 1− h)ds − χy + r(1 + h)B (10)
Macroeconomic equilibria are derived from the minimization of the ﬁscal loss
functions and from the public deﬁcit breakdown.
44N u m e r i c a l S i m u l a t i o n
We considere that stabilization consists in reducing the shock impact on welfare
losses. We study ﬁscal stabilization within the model when a negative asymmetric
shock occurs (1% of GDP). The sensibility of demand to public deﬁcit on demand
is suggested by Bouthevillain and al. (2001). Interest rate sensitivity is issued from
Mojon and Peersman (2001). Penalty value f corresponds to the variable part of the
Pact ﬁnancial sanction, i.e. a tenth of the ﬁscal overrun. Deﬁcit sensitivity to the
cycle, debt level and public investment growth are the euro zones’ average values.
The others parameters are issued from Engwerda and al. (2002). They will allow
the determination of foreign trade inﬂuence (Ω and µ). The set of parameters is
g i v e ni nT a b l eI .
Table I. Parameter Values
γρ η εθ β 1 β2 φ1 φ2 fhχ B Ω µ
0 . 7 50 . 20 . 40 . 50 . 2 50 . 20 . 2 50 . 50 . 2 50 . 10 . 10 . 50 . 60 . 2 30 . 0 3
The set of parameters above allows determination impact of interest rate (ψ),
public deﬁcit (a), ﬁscal externality (b)a n ds h o c k( c). These parameters vary ac-
cording to which rule is observed, either the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), the
structural deﬁcit rule (SDR) or the golden rule (GR). Parameters are gathered in
Table II.
Table II. Impact Parameter Values
SGP SDR GR
ψ 0.201 -0.134 -0.156
a 0.562 0.411 0.368
b 0.158 0.117 0.104
c 0.539 0.392 0.392
From the public deﬁcit breakdown, it is possible to consider the positive eﬀect of
interest payment on demand. These payment decrease the interest rate’s negative
inﬂuence on national product because payment constitutes an additional income for
the agents. It consequently modiﬁes the sign of the interest rate impact as interest
rate sensitivity is weaker than interest payment (ρ < γB). The structural ﬁscal
rules therefore allow for a consistent policy mix since ﬁscal activism does not implie
a tight monetary policy. The public deﬁcit impact on product (a), ﬁscal externality
(b) and the asymmetrical shock impact on product (c) are weaker than with the
SGP. This is mainly due to the role of the automatic stabilizers which absorb part
5of the shock propagation. Strong growth in public investment can also decrease the
width of golden rule’s parameters.
Simulation results for deﬁcit, product, inﬂation and ﬁscal loss can be found in
Table III. The results depend on ﬁscal rule is actually observed.
Table III. Results
SGP SDR GR
d 0.491 0.442 0.381
y -0.340 -0.260 -0.291
π -0.076 -0.058 -0.065
LG 0.228 0.162 0.164
Values are variable reactions to a negative shock.
deﬁcit is the eﬀective deﬁcit for the SGP, the structural deﬁcit for SDR, and the current
deﬁcit for the GR.
Since public deﬁcits are counter-cyclical, they evolve in the opposite direction
to the shock. Deﬁcit reactions are weaker when the structural rules are observed.
They react only to the part of the shock which has not been absorbed by the cyclical
deﬁcit. As the golden rule does not take account of public investment, current
deﬁcit is weaker than the structural deﬁcit. The risk is then that governments may
substitute public expenditure for current expenditure so as to abide by the golden
rule.
Fiscal impact parameters (a and b)a n dd e ﬁcit reactions are lower with the
structural rules than with the SGP. Fluctuations of the national products are con-
sequently weaker, which means better stabilization. The same considerations apply
to inﬂation. It results from this that the SGP is dominated by the structural rules
since the shock has greater overall impact on the ﬁscal loss. The structural deﬁcit
rule generate a slightly weaker loss than the golden rule but the future repercussions
of the golden rule on public investments also need consideration.
5C o n c l u s i o n
The objective of this paper is to provide a comparison between the Stability
and Growth Pact and the structural rules (the structural deﬁc i tr u l ea n dt h eg o l d e n
rule) in terms of stabilization performance. We used the same framework for all
rules and noted that the structural rules lead to better stabilization. Consequently,
the application of such rules through a reform of the SGP would be desirable in the
EU. The reform of the Pact in March 2005 already constitutes a ﬁrst step towards
the golden rule.
6The right target obviously needs to be struck between simplicity and eﬀective-
ness. Although the structural rules seem more eﬀective, especially towards achieving
ﬁscal stabilization, they also appear more complex than the Pact. Moreover, the ap-
plication of these rules implies an harmonization of the evaluation techniques. The
determination of potential growth must be clariﬁed too. The golden rule also calls a
clear deﬁnition of public investment and how it can be measured. These conditions
must be met so the transparency of the rules can be guaranteed.
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